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MARKET
DALE W.R. ROSENTHAL◦ AND NORDIA D. M. THOMAS∗
Abstract. We develop a price maker/taker model to study how a fi-
nancial transaction tax affects markets. We find taxes widen quoted and
effective spreads by more than twice the tax. Taxes increase volatility
slightly (without intermediation) to significantly (with intermediation).
High taxes may halve volumes and gains from trade while doubling
search costs. Measures of market quality are more affected by taxes
in markets with intermediaries. Investors and intermediaries competing
for liquidity can triple search costs and increase quoted spreads while
decreasing effective spreads. We also find revenue-optimal rates of 60–75
bp. Our results are particularly relevant to markets with high-frequency
trading or thin depth. JEL: C72, D44, G19
Keywords: transaction tax, Tobin tax, market microstructure, limit or-
der model, high-frequency trading, search costs
Regulators have recently discussed taxing financial transactions. Support-
ers of such a tax claim it would deter (presumably harmful) speculation, and
some tout the potential revenue that could be raised and its impact on the
national budget deficit. Opponents of a transaction tax argue it will lead
to reduced liquidity and make trading more costly, and many note that this
would make trading too costly for some investors. To assess these claims,
we model a price maker/taker market and then study how a transaction tax
affects that market. Our model is relevant for policy makers and academics
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considering the effects of enacting, changing, or repealing a transaction tax.
The model also yields insights into how varying levels of intermediation and
transaction taxes affect markets. Since investors and intermediaries com-
pete for liquidity, this work is especially applicable to markets with high-
frequency traders or thin liquidity.1
Many supporters of a tax cite Tobin’s (1974) proposal of a 1% tax on
foreign exchange transactions to reduce short-term speculation after the
end of Bretton Woods.2 He hoped to “throw sand in the wheels of the
market” thereby allowing nations greater leeway in exchange rate policies
and in staving off monetary crises. Policy makers supporting a ‘broad-based’
securities transaction tax include Larry Summers, US Representative Peter
DeFazio, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and Keynes (1936).3 These
policy makers argue that most short-term financial transactions are driven
by speculators causing excessive volatility in the financial markets.4
Opponents are mostly academics who suggest that a Tobin-like transac-
tion tax would have negative effects overall. They argue that such a tax
would increase price volatility due to reduced trading volume and increased
bid-ask spreads, not reduce excess price volatility, decrease security values,
and increase the cost of capital.
Since this debate is contentious, policy makers would benefit greatly from
theoretical models. Models would also help policy makers assess various
tradeoffs in implementing a tax as well as informing policy in circumstances
that have not been previously observed. For unusual or rare policies such
as transaction taxes, theoretical models may be our only hope of assessing
1“Thin” liquidity means that the size of the inside bid-ask quotes are small.
2This idea was reiterated and expounded upon in Tobin (1978) and Tobin (1984).
3A broad-based tax is one that would be levied on all financial securities such as stocks,
bonds, options and futures with only government securities exempt.
4The October 1987 market crash, the 6 May 2010 “flash crash,” and the recent financial
crisis are often cited as examples cum outcomes of harmful speculation.
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potential policy effects. Since transaction taxes would directly affect the
microstructure of markets — market efficiency, liquidity, and volatility — we
examine taxes using microstructure models. While microstructure is a very
different field from macroeconomics, microstructure effects like secondary
market liquidity are of vital importance to funding liquidity and the efficacy
of primary markets.
Our model features a sequence of traders who strategically choose price
taking versus price making. This mirrors market behavior observed by
Anand et al. (2005) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2009). The model is sim-
ilar in spirit to Foucault (1999) but allows for a range of private reserve
valuations as well as varying proportions of pure market makers. These
sources of variation enable us to study the impact of a transaction tax on
investors and market makers. The sequential market structure is most ap-
plicable to markets which are thin or effectively thin. Black (1971) noted
that markets in which traders compete (on speed) to get the best price are
effectively thin. Therefore, this model has policy implications for markets
with high-frequency traders. A nice feature of our model is that we can ex-
amine search costs without many of the assumptions or heavy mathematical
machinery present in other models.5 In particular, we make no assumption
about the arrival rates of a match; rather, matching happens endogenously
by traders setting prices to achieve their equilibrium maximum benefit.
We expected ex-ante that a transaction tax of τ/share would increase the
spread by 2τ as price makers recover the tax through their quotes. We also
expected this widened spread to yield (i) lower fill rates/volume, (ii) more
limit orders (vs market orders), (iii) greater execution costs, and (iv) longer
times for buyers and sellers to find each other (aka search costs).
5Search costs are a measure of liquidity defined by Lippman and McCall (1986) as “the
time until an asset is exchanged for money.”
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We find that participants who must pay a tax widen their quotes and
are less likely to trade. For small values of the tax, a 1bp increase in tax
decreases the volume traded by 0.2%–0.3%. Furthermore, we find that the
maximal revenue raised is about half of the na¨ıve assumption of tax × pre-
tax volume. For a 50 bp tax without market makers, we find quoted spreads
widen by 36%; effective spreads widen by 38%; investors pay 2.6 times the
tax; volatilities increase by 7%; volumes decrease by 38%; gains from trade
fall by 50%; and, search costs increase to 1.6 times the untaxed costs. If
half the potential traders are market makers, we predict quoted and effective
spreads widen by 43%; investors pay 2.8 times the tax; volatility increases
by 59%; volume decreases by 46%; gains from trade fall by 60%; and, search
costs increase to 2.2 times the untaxed costs. The revenue-optimal tax of 62–
75 bp increases spreads by about 50%; decreases volume by about 50%; and,
reduces the benefits of providing liquidity by about two-thirds. As to the
effects of intermediation in high-frequency or “thin” markets, we find that
having more market makers increases spreads by up to 37%–43% for half
the potential traders being market makers. This occurs because investors
and market makers compete for liquidity. In general, we find that market
makers make market quality more sensitive to taxes.
1. Literature Review
Historically, securities transactions taxes have been proposed, enacted,
modified, and even repealed in various countries.6 Summers and Summers
(1989), Stiglitz (1989), Kupiec (1995), Frankel (1996), Felix and Sau (1996),
Palley (1999), and Baker (2000) have all proposed ‘Tobin-like’ taxes for
various financial markets. ul Haq et al. (1996) and Spahn (2002) suggest a
6Countries which have considered or enacted financial transaction taxes include Australia,
Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United
Kingdom.
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0.1% to 0.2% tax would balance the opposing objectives of lowering price
volatility due to speculation and maintaining market liquidity. Both studies
point out, however, that such a modest tax would likely have little impact
on speculative activity. Pollin et al. (2003) consider a securities transaction
tax for US financial markets as “one feature of a new financial architecture
aimed at contributing to financial stabilization.”
Studies opposed to transaction taxes include Friedman (1953), Grundfest
and Shoven (1991), Campbell and Froot (1994), Kupiec (1995), Habermeier
and Kirilenko (2001), and Forbes (2001). Schwert and Seguin (1993) give
a comprehensive overview of arguments both for and against a securities
transaction tax.
Empirical studies disagree as well. Umlauf’s (1993) study of Sweden im-
posing a 1% transaction tax in 1984 (and doubling it in 1986) found that
30% of equity trading volume moved to London, the market for interest
rate options dried up, market volatility did not decline, and volume did not
return to pre-tax levels when the tax was repealed in 1987.7 Liu and Zhu
(2009) found the October 1999 deregulation of full commissions in Japan
significantly increased price volatility in the equities market. Jones and
Seguin (1997), however, found that reducing commissions on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) in 1975
was followed by reduced market volatility in the following year.
Habermeier and Kirilenko (2001) posit three reasons for this disagree-
ment. First, securities transaction taxes are often enacted with other policy
shifts confounding causal inferences about changes in market measures. Sec-
ond, measuring the tax reduction of noise trading is difficult since there is
no way to determine if decreased market volume is due to informed traders
7For the years 1988–1990 between 48% and 52% of trading volume in Swedish equities
occurred in London. This may explain Swedish opposition to a transaction tax.
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or noise traders. Third, if asset prices change because of the tax, there
is no way to determine if this was due to anticipation of the tax, trading
moving to other venues, or untaxed securities. We would add two more rea-
sons. First, comparing empirical studies is harder because securities trans-
action taxes vary in size and scope — from 0.13 basis points (bp) to 528 bp
(5.28%). Second, reducing commissions is not the same as reducing a tax
since lower commissions reduce rent-extraction and expose financial firms
to more competition. Thus initial conditions of profitability and competi-
tion might explain the differences between Liu and Zhu (2009) and Jones
and Seguin (1997). All of these issues make excellent arguments in favor of
theoretical studies.
Very few microstructure-based studies have been done. Dupont and Lee
(2007) investigated a transaction tax using a Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
model incorporating spread and depth. They found that higher information
asymmetry made the tax more likely to decrease market liquidity. Mannaro
et al. (2008) used heterogeneous agent types to study transaction taxes in
simulated markets. For a single market, they found volatility increased as
the number of orders decreased; for two competing markets, traders tended
to avoid the taxed market — which exhibited higher volatility than the
untaxed market. Cipriani and Guarino (2008) found that a tax caused a
laboratory financial market (sequential trading, one market maker) to cease
trading during large disparities between an asset’s price and true value.
However, reduced noise trading caused by the tax offset some of the induced
market inefficiency. Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009) showed that if adequate
liquidity were maintained a tax could help stabilize both double-auction and
dealer markets.8 Otherwise, a tax reduced trading volume which increased
8Maintenance of adequate liquidity for such findings to be relevant is more likely in a
dealer market where a market maker is expected to maintain a two-sided market.
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volatility as each trade had greater price impact. Demary (2010) used an
agent-based framework to show that tax rates above 0.1% destabilized the
market and that taxes had stronger effects on more risk-averse traders.
Our model also allows inference about search costs. Typically, search
models assume sequential search and bargaining and explicitly detail the
search process (for example, assuming Poisson arrival rates to the market).
Buyers and sellers seek to trade one unit of an asset with pairings assigned
by a matching process. Paired traders bargain in an attempt to agree on
a price of the asset and re-enter the market until an agreement is reached.
Examples of such models include Diamond (1982), Rubenstein and Wolin-
sky (1985), Gale (1987a,b), Binmore and Herrero (1988), Lu and McAfee
(1996), Mortensen and Wright (2002), Duffie et al. (2005), and Duffie et al.
(2010). Our model is more similar to how Lo and MacKinlay (1990) looked
at nonsynchronous trading.
2. Model
Our limit order book model is similar to the simple price maker/taker
model of Foucault (1999).9 The economy has one risky asset with funda-
mental value v. Traders arrive sequentially, one per unit of time, and have
a spectrum of idiosyncratic reserve values v + dt where dt
iid∼ F . We assume
that F is a distribution with a mean of zero and finite variance: a trader
with dt < 0 would prefer to sell, a trader with dt > 0 would prefer to buy.
We assume that traders have heterogeneous reasons for trading: alpha
(real or perceived), business risks to hedge, and inventory risk to eliminate
being a few examples of such reasons. We also assume traders have access to
9Traders in the Foucault (1999) framework have only two possible reservation values, v±L
which occur with equal probability. We allow a range of private valuations and quotes
based on these private valuations because for only two possible valuations, as in Foucault
(1999), a tax would either have no effect or eliminate all trading.
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inventory or borrowed stock which allows them to sell without constraints.10
For simplicity and tractability, quotes live for only one period; and, to pre-
vent gaming, the market continues at each period with non-unit probability
ρ. Traders realize the utility of their trade (whether through expected return
or by benefiting from a risk-reducing hedge) immediately following trading.
2.1. Strategic Quoting. Each trader seeks to trade one unit of the risky
asset. Trading may be done by taking the prevailing bid-ask quote (i.e. send-
ing a market order) or by making a new bid-ask quote (sending limit orders
which replace the prevailing quote).11 Thus each trader plays a game against
the next trader. To clarify the exposition, we will call these two traders Ilsa
(the time t trader) and Rick (the time t+ 1 trader).12
Traders pay tax at both position entry and exit. Thus if Ilsa trades with
Rick, each is debited a transaction tax of τ . Consequently, one could con-
jecture that if Ilsa quotes a bid and ask, she will shade her quotes, i.e. pass
on some amount of the tax to Rick by quoting a bid of v − δt and an ask of
v + βt, where δt and βt are functions of the tax τ . Ilsa must solve for these
equilibrium offsets to decide the optimal amount of the tax to (potentially)
pass on to Rick. This strategic price shading causes δt and βt to be func-
tions of Ilsa’s reservation value v + dt, the distribution of Rick’s unknown
reservation value v+dt+1, and the transaction tax τ . A layout of the model
framework is shown in Figure 1.
10Institutional traders generally have access to borrowable stock via brokerage customer’s
holdings as well as market making inventory.
11This yields phenomena seen in markets such as failure to trade when no one of the
opposite preference arrives in the market. Since trading is not guaranteed, the model
helps explain how equilibrium fill rates/volumes are affected by changes in market setup.
12While we use this language to discuss the game played by each trader, this should not
be construed as implying a repeated game. The setup is a sequential trader model: as
time goes by, a sequence of unique traders arrive. Thus if a trader Sam first plays the
game at any time s, we know that Sam will never play it again.
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Figure 1. Details of trader’s revenues in different scenarios.
The revenue for a market order is given by RM = (δt−1+dt)∧
(βt−1−dt)−2τ . With probability ρ < 1, the market continues
if a trader has placed limit orders (quoted a bid and an ask).
If the market continues, the underlying asset price can be the
same or higher with probability k or the same or lower with
probability (1− k).
Because the game played every time period is between the current and
next-period trader, the solution takes a form which does not depend on
past states. Therefore, we can assume that prices are static (i.e. ∆v = 0)
without loss of generality and solve for equilibrium δ and β (without time
subscripts). Were ∆v 6= 0, we could merely shift the dt distribution F (as
well as δ and β) by E(∆v). Were Var(∆v) > 0, we could scale F to have a
variance of Var(∆v) + Var(dt). Therefore, while we work with static prices,
the results here are applicable to stochastically-evolving prices.
We determine optimal trade strategies by working forward from time t.
Traders who decide to quote choose not to take the current bid or ask price;
they prefer the expected value of their optimal quote to that of the current
quote. This optimal expected value defines the boundary between sending a
market order and quoting and varies with the reservation value v+dt. Ilsa’s
expected quote revenue, RQ, then has the form:
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RQ = ρP (Rick sells at bid)(
utility or
sale price︷ ︸︸ ︷
v + dt −
bought
from Rick︷ ︸︸ ︷
(v − δ) −2τ)
+ ρP (Rick buys at ask)(v + β︸ ︷︷ ︸
sold to
Rick
− (v + dt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility or
buy price
−2τ).
(1)
= ρP (Rick sells at bid)(δ + dt − 2τ)
+ ρP (Rick buys at ask)(β − dt − 2τ).
(2)
The next trader, Rick, enters the market at time t+1 and decides whether
to trade against Ilsa’s quote or quote a bid and ask for the following trader
based on his optimal quote revenue R0∗Q . Rick makes this decision according
to the logic in Table 1.
Condition Action
v − δ − (v + dt+1)− 2τ > R0∗Q
⇒ dt+1 < −R0∗Q − δ − 2τ Sell at Ilsa’s bid
v + dt+1 − (v + β)− 2τ > R0∗Q
⇒ dt+1 > R0∗Q + β + 2τ Buy at Ilsa’s ask
Otherwise Quote new bid and ask
Table 1. Rick’s decision rules for placing a market order to
trade against Ilsa’s quote when the asset price is stochastic.
If none of the conditions are satisfied, Rick will quote his own
bid and ask instead.
The time t trader, Ilsa, knows nothing about the preference for the risky
asset of the time t + 1 trader, Rick. Therefore, she solves for his optimal
fixed-point quote revenue R0∗Q given the unconditional distribution of dt+1
and setting RQ = R
0∗
Q in equation (2).
Ilsa maximizes her quote revenue by setting the partial derivatives,
∂RQ
∂δ
and
∂RQ
∂β , to 0 and solving. This implies that her optimal strategy is to bid
TRANSACTION TAXES IN A PRICE MAKER/TAKER MARKET 11
at v − δ and ask for v + β, where the bid and ask offsets are respectively,13
δ =
F (B(δ))− f(B(δ))(dt − 2τ)∂B∂δ
f(B(δ))∂B∂δ
,(3)
β =
F (A(β))− f(A(β))(−dt − 2τ)∂A∂β
f(A(β))∂A∂β
,(4)
where F and f are the unconditional cdf and pdf of dt+1, B(δ) = −R0∗Q −
δ − 2τ is the expected benefit of Rick taking liquidity at Ilsa’s bid, and
A(β) = −R0∗Q − β − 2τ is the (sign-flipped) expected benefit of Rick taking
liquidity at Ilsa’s asking price.
2.2. Distributional Assumptions. To see how this model behaves, we
assume that dt comes from a mixture of a normal distribution and an atomic
distribution. Thus traders are of two types, pure market makers (dt = 0)
and investors with a fraction µ of traders being pure market makers.14
(5) dt
iid∼

0 w.p. µ
N(0, L2) w.p. 1− µ.
With this assumpton about dt, we can rewrite the unconditional expected
quote revenue, RQ, as:
RQ = ρ(1− µ)Φ
(
−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ
L
)
(δ + dt − 2τ)
+ ρ(1− µ)Φ
(
−R0∗Q − β − 2τ
L
)
(β − dt − 2τ)
+ ρµI(−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ ≥ 0)(δ + dt − 2τ)
+ ρµI(−R0∗Q − β − 2τ ≥ 0)(β − dt − 2τ)
(6)
13Note that we have used the symmetry of F to express the probability of Rick trading
at Ilsa’s asking price in equation 2 via F instead of 1− F .
14Assigning dt = 0 makes market makers indifferent between buying and selling; the effect
of inventory risk is ignored. However, market makers with inventory risk can be thought
of as belonging to the population of traders with normally-distributed dt’s.
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where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Solving
for R0∗Q requires breaking the spectrum of dt’s into three regions: where nei-
ther indicator function is active, where the first indicator function is active,
and where the second indicator function is active. (Solving in these last
two regions requires constrained optimization.) We then find the optimum
across the three regions. The indicator functions capture if the next trader
is a market maker who takes the quoted bid or ask, so we know that both
will not be active simultaneously.
3. Numerical Analysis
To study how a transaction tax would affect market quality, we analyze
how traders are affected by differing levels of such a tax τ ranging from 0 to
50 bp. We also study the effect of taxes for different proportions of market
makers to all potential traders. The mean reservation value is v = $20 with
a reservation value standard deviation of L = $0.50 (2.5% of v), and the
market continuation probability ρ = 0.9. We look at both the average effect
across the market and the effect for market makers.
From the basic dynamics with these parameters, we can see that we al-
ready have a rich model. Figure 2 shows that even the dynamics for a market
with static v and no taxes displays the sort of variation in trade prices seen
in real data. We can also note that having more market makers tends to
stabilize the range in which a security trades.
3.1. Quotes and Volume. Figure 3 shows that the quoted spread without
market makers increases by 42% from $0.68 with no tax to $0.97 with a 50
bp ($0.10) tax; with 50% market makers the quoted spread increases 38%
from $0.69 to $0.95. At τ = 50 bp ($0.10), the change in the quoted spread
is 2.9× and 2.6× the change in the tax, for markets without market makers
and with 50% market makers. In other words: traders pay 160%–190% more
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Figure 2. Simulated trades (stars) and quotes (lines) for a
market with no transaction tax. The plot on the left is for a
market with no market makers; the plot on the right is for a
market where 50% of those arriving at the market are market
makers. Note that the market with market makers displays
more bid-ask bounce yet trades in a tighter range: All trades
occur between $19.50 and $20.50 while trades occur outside
this range for the market without market makers (left). Both
show that the model dynamics mimic behavior that is seen
in real data.
than the tax. Figure 4 shows about a 50% drop in the volume (fill rate) at
a tax of 50 bp regardless of the presence of market makers.
Finally we note that the average traders’ benefit from trading without
market makers decreases from $0.15/share to $0.08/share; with 50% market
makers, this benefit decreases from $0.13/share to $0.06/share. Thus the
gains from trade fall by about 47% and 54%, respectively.15 To the extent
that market makers might have costs comparable to their expected revenues,
we could expect market makers exiting the market more quickly than this
model suggests. This might suggest that high-tax regimes would look more
15One way to think about this figure is of expected returns or revenues. If we add in
any assumption of costs, the profitability would fall by even more. Thus the likelihood of
trading and the fill rate would drop by even more than is shown here.
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Figure 3. Quoted bid-ask spread (in basis points) vs trans-
action tax rates (in basis points). Curves show 10% in-
crements of market makers, from none to half of potential
traders. Traders have a reservation value offset of 0 (market
makers) or with volatility of 2.5% (investors). Above 20 bp,
the marginal spread is greater than the marginal tax; and,
above 25 bp of tax, the wider spread means investors pay
more than the tax.
like the models without market makers (even higher quoted spreads, lower
fill rates, and lower expected returns for those who are not market makers).
3.2. Search Costs. In Trading and Exchanges, Harris says, “Trading is a
search problem. [. . . ] Sellers seek buyers willing to pay high prices. Buyers
seek sellers willing to sell at low prices.” Typically, search models take the
form of sequential search and bargain models. For this reason, our model is
well-constructed to allow insight into search costs. However, we must forgo
caring about the intermediate sequential search and bargain processes, and
only focus on how long it takes in toto until a trade occurs. Since Lippman
and McCall (1986) view liquidity as “the time until an asset is exchanged for
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Figure 4. Fill rate vs transaction tax rates (in basis points).
Curves are shown for 10% increments of market makers,
from none to half of potential traders being market makers.
Traders have a reservation value offset of 0 (market mak-
ers) or with volatility of 2.5% (investors). The fill rate drops
55%–59% at a tax rate of 50 bp.
money”, we study how a transaction tax affects the average time between
trades.
If the probability of a fill is Pf (i.e. the probability a limit order will be
executed), we can infer the waiting time between trades, tw, by inverting
the probability of a fill: tw ∝ Pf−1. We know that Ilsa’s probability of a fill
is related to Rick’s (time t+ 1) decision to trade.
Pf =P (next trader sells at bid) + P (next trader buys at ask).(7)
=ρ(1− µ)Φ
(
−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ
L
)
+ ρ(1− µ)Φ
(
−R0∗Q − β − 2τ
L
)
+ ρµP (−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ ≥ 0) + ρµP (−R0∗Q − β − 2τ ≥ 0)
(8)
Using this equation, we get the results shown in Figure 6.
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Transaction Tax (bp)
Figure 5. Gains from quoting vs transaction tax rate (in
basis points). Curves show 10% increments of market mak-
ers, from none to half of potential traders. Traders have a
reservation value offset of 0 (market makers) or with volatil-
ity of 2.5% (investors). Above 20 bp, note that gains from
trade drop about 47% for a 50 bp tax without market makers
and about 54% for a 50 bp tax with half the potential traders
being market makers. The gains from trade can be thought
of as revenues or expected returns. Note, however, that this
does not include costs (which are not modeled).
We find that, in general, as the level of the tax increases, the waiting
times between trades rises. While the results are qualitatively similar for
markets with different fractions of market makers, the effect of a transaction
tax on search costs is much greater for markets with more market makers.
Without market makers, a transaction tax of 25 bp would increase search
times by about 36% and a tax of 50 bp would increase search times by about
110%. With 50% market makers, a transaction tax of 25 bp would increase
search times by about 13% and a tax of 50 bp would increase search times
by about 116%. Thus while market makers reduce spreads, the benefits of
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Figure 6. Search costs (expected waiting times to trade)
vs transaction tax rate (in basis points). Curves show 10%
increments of market makers, from none to half of potential
traders. Traders have a reservation value offset of 0 (market
makers) or with volatility of 2.5% (investors).
their intermediation disappear more quickly as taxes increase compared to
the benefits of other traders.
3.3. Revenue-Optimal Tax Rates. Since one argument for transaction
taxes is their revenue-generating capabilities, we consider the maximal gov-
ernment revenue possible in our model. The Laffer curve in Figure 7 shows
that the maximum government revenue of 6–16 cents per share would be
generated at tax rates of 62–75 bp with lower taxes being revenue-optimal
with greater fractions of market makers.
At these tax rates, however, the quoted spread would widen to between
270 bp (no market makers) and 370 bp (50% market makers) — about 50%
greater than untaxed spreads. Fill rates would fall to between 21% (no mar-
ket makers) and 10% (50% market makers) — volume declines of 52%–55%.
In line with this, search costs more than double (2.1×–2.2×) compared to
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Figure 7. Laffer curve: Transaction tax rates vs equilib-
rium tax revenues (in basis points) with revenue-optimal
rates indicated by a circle. Curves show 10% increments
of market makers, from none to half of potential traders.
Traders have a reservation value offset of 0 (market makers)
or with volatility of 2.5% (investors). Note that the revenue-
optimal tax would be between 62 bp and 75 bp and that
tax revenue falls by about two-thirds for half of the potential
traders being intermediaries. Thus more developed markets
(with more intermediation) would yield less expected revenue
per order under a transaction tax.
untaxed search costs. The value of quoting declines by over two-thirds or
more (over 70% for 50% market markers).16 All of these results suggest
conditions that would likely induce trading to move elsewhere. Finally, the
revenue raised falls by over two thirds between markets with no intermedi-
ation and those with 50% of potential traders being market makers. This
suggests that more developed markets are more sensitive to taxation and
may yield lower expected revenue per order.
16Since a trader may choose not to quote if the prior quote is more appealing, the quote
revenue is a lower bound to gains from trade.
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3.4. Simulation Results. Not all of the comparative statics we are con-
cerned about are easily found by solving the game played by Ilsa and Rick.
We examine the effective (i.e. realized at trade time) bid-ask spread, the
gains from trade, and price volatility. While we could try to derive the
volatility from the quoted spread using Roll (1984), that would ignore the
endogeneity of when trade occurs and thus would be inaccurate.
For each level of tax explored, we generate a random sequence of 5,000
traders with iid reservation value offsets. For each trader, we record their
trading decision (make or take prices). If a trade occurs, we record the
direction (buy/sell), the price, and the expected gain from trade.
The plot in Figure 8 (effective spread) shows that without market makers,
adding a 50 bp tax increases the effective spread by 38%. If half the potential
traders are market makers, a 50 bp tax increases the effective spread by
45% versus the untaxed spread. Finally, adding market makers increases
the quoted spreads (Figure 3), but decreases the effective spread across all
levels of tax.
Figure 9 (volatility) shows that without market makers, adding a 50 bp
tax increases the volatility by 2%. If half the potential traders are market
makers, a 50 bp tax increases the volatility by 60% versus the untaxed
volatility. Furthermore, these lines cross, so above a tax of about 42 bp, a
market without market makers is less volatile than a market with half the
potential traders being market makers. This may explain differences seen
in various analyses: that sometimes a tax reduces volatility and sometimes
a tax raises volatility. Either way, market quality in markets with market
makers may be much more fragile than in markets which lack market makers.
Since market makers are intermediaries, they are unlikely to take a di-
rectional bet. Therefore we might expect that they will trade closer to the
mean reservation value and thus for lower expected revenue than most other
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Figure 8. Effective spreads (spreads at trade times) vs
transaction tax rate (in basis points). Curves show 10% in-
crements of market makers, from none to half of potential
traders. Traders have a reservation value offset of 0 (mar-
ket makers) or with volatility of 2.5% (investors). Note that
more market makers reduce effective spreads while higher
taxes increase effective spreads.
traders. This is indeed the case: increasing the fraction of market makers
lowers the average gains from trade. (One could also view this as market
makers reducing the dispersion in beliefs about prices.) The average gains
from trade in a market without market makers decreases by about 23% for
a 50 bp tax; if half the potential traders are market makers, a 50 bp tax
decreases the average gains from trade by about 27%.
While market makers intermediate for lower returns, we might wonder
if they make up for lower expected returns with higher volume. Figure 10
(gains from trade) shows the total gains from trade. Unfortunately, that
does not seem to be the case. The plot shows that the total gains from
trade are higher without market makers. (Obviously, this is not accounting
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Figure 9. Volatility (of trade prices) vs transaction tax rate
(in basis points). Curves show 10% increments of market
makers, from none to half of potential traders. Market mak-
ers have a reservation value offset of 0 while investors have an
offset with volatility of 2.5%. Note that more market mak-
ers leads to lower volatility yet makes market volatility more
sensitive to taxes.
for transactions costs.) For markets with and without market makers, the
total gains from trade drop about 50% for a 50 bp tax.
3.5. Summary. The resulting market characteristics are summarized in
Table 2 for four tax rates of interest (0 bp, 10 bp, 25 bp, and 50 bp) and
two fractions of potential market makers (0% and 50%). We choose these
rates because 10 bp is one European Commission-recommended and France-
approved rate, 25 bp was proposed by US Representative DeFazio, and 50
bp was the largest such tax ever proposed in the US.
4. Conclusion
Following the recent financial crisis, regulators have tried to assure the
public that such a crisis would not recur, that those responsible would be
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Figure 10. Total gains from trade vs transaction tax rate
(in basis points) for 10000 simulated trades. Curves show
10% increments of market makers, from none to half of po-
tential traders. Traders have a reservation value offset of 0
(market v makers) or with volatility of 2.5% (investors). Note
that more market makers leads to lower gains from trade (to-
tal and average) since market makers trade for small margins.
For markets with and without market makers, a 50 bp tax
decreases the total gains from trade by about 50%.
penalized, and that the financial industry would pay for being bailed out.
Some policy makers have proposed a securities transaction tax to meet these
goals with the idea that a tax would reduce price volatility; encourage long-
term investing; raise large amounts of revenue from a very small tax; and,
push harmful speculators out of the market.17 Peel (2010) reported that
German Chancellor Angela Merkel is “pushing for a Europe-wide financial
transaction tax by 2012” which she expects to raise “an extra e2B per year
for the German budget.” Opponents of transaction taxes, however, have ar-
gued that a transaction tax will reduce liquidity and increase trading costs
17See Eichengreen et al. (1995), Stiglitz (1989), and Summers and Summers (1989) for a
review of these issues.
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A: No market makers Transaction tax τ =
Relevant Measures 0 bp 10 bp 25 bp 50 bp
quoted bid-ask spread, s $0.35 $0.38 $0.42 $0.48
effective bid-ask spread, s¯ $0.69 $0.74 $0.82 $0.95
price volatility 1.19% 1.18% 1.22% 1.27%
fill rate, Pf 42% 39% 34% 26%
quote revenue, R0∗Q $0.146 $0.132 $0.111 $0.078
total gains from trade $966 $857 $719 $488
B: 50% market makers Transaction tax τ =
Relevant Measures 0 bp 10 bp 25 bp 50 bp
quoted bid-ask spread, s $0.48 $0.53 $0.59 $0.69
effective bid-ask spread, s¯ $0.65 $0.71 $0.79 $0.93
price volatility 0.82% 0.91% 1.06% 1.30%
fill rate, Pf 19% 17% 13% 9%
quote revenue, R0∗Q $0.130 $0.114 $0.091 $0.060
total gains from trade $287 $242 $173 $97
Table 2. Effects of policy-relevant transactions taxes for a
$20 asset where investors have reservation value volatility of
2.5% and market makers have reservation value equal to the
average reservation value. Effects are averaged over the pop-
ulations of potential traders for populations with no market
makers (Panel A) and 50% market makers (Panel B). The 10
bp tax is a level recently suggested by the European Com-
mission, and the 25 bp and 50 bp levels have been proposed
in the US. Total gains from trade is for a simulated sequence
of 5000 potential traders.
making trading too expensive for some investors. They have also said a tax
such as the broad-based one proposed by DeFazio will be difficult to imple-
ment (especially across asset classes), will distort the market by reducing
market efficiency, and will push traders to other venues or countries.18
Policy makers cannot easily experiment with their markets; and, it is
not clear how informative empirical studies are to proposed taxes on other
markets. We developed this model both to guide policy makers and to help
academics understand how different aspects of market quality may be related
or affected by policy changes. The resulting sequential trader model is very
18See, for example Habermeier and Kirilenko (2001), Campbell and Froot (1994), and
Schwert and Seguin (1993).
24 D. W. R. ROSENTHAL AND N. D. M. THOMAS
clean in its assumptions — a contribution to the market microstructure
literature in its own right. However, the model also has much to say about
the effects of intermediation in thin/fast markets as well as the effects of
financial transaction taxes. In the future, we will extend the model to study
the effects of competing market makers or a specialist.
What the model suggests should give pause to the hasty imposition of
transaction taxes. Declining market volume could be an indication that
some traders (possibly speculators) are being pushed out by the tax, as
desired. However, we also find that quoted and effective spreads widen,
volatility increases, and both the benefits of providing liquidity and gains
from trade decrease. Depending on their urgency, investors trading in this
lower liquidity environment might be subject to higher adverse selection.
Any one of these could be harmful; in concert, they could hobble traders
with genuine needs to trade. Furthermore, these changes in the secondary
market would likely reduce the ability of companies to raise funds in the
primary market; thus a tax could reduce job and wealth creation.
In markets without market makers, we find that a 50 bp tax increases
quoted and effective spreads by more than one-third; investors pay 2.6 times
the tax; volatility increases slightly; volume drops by almost 40%; search
costs increase by 60%; and, the benefit of providing liquidity and gains from
trade are halved. In markets with half the traders being market makers, we
find that a 50 bp tax increases quoted and effective spreads by more than
40%; investors pay 2.8 times the tax; volatility increases by almost 60%;
volume drops by about 45%; search costs increase by 120%; the benefit of
providing liquidity drops by over 50%; and, gains from trade decrease by
nearly two-thirds. We find that the revenue-optimal tax would be between
roughly 60 bp and 75 bp; however, these rates would be even more harmful
to market quality.
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Because the model is one of sequential traders, it is especially applica-
ble to markets where liquidity is thin (where inside bid-ask quotes are of
small size). As many have noted, and Black (1971) predicted, this includes
markets where high-frequency trading is prevalent since those markets can
be effectively thin. In thin markets, market makers can reduce liquidity for
other traders if they compete to trade. This would be particularly relevant
for high-frequency traders who are not only intermediaries but also engage in
proprietary trading. Since this describes a large portion of current securities
markets, we believe this analysis is important for policy makers considering
implementing a financial transaction tax.
While it was not our goal, the model also yields information about the
effects of intermediation in thin/fast markets. Increasing the proportion of
actors who are market makers may increase quoted bid-ask spreads while
simultaneously decreasing effective (realized) spreads. This may help disen-
tangle seemingly conflicting findings between these two measures of liquidity.
Increasing the fraction of market makers also reduces volatility, and gains
from trade (since markets are more efficient with market makers). Volume
also decreases. While this could be viewed negatively, it might merely re-
flect that markets are more efficient and thus there are fewer opportunities
to make outsized profits.
Finally, increasing the fraction of market makers causes markets to be
more sensitive to transaction taxes. Under a tax, volatility increases to
exceed that of a market lacking intermediaries. Volume also drops by a
greater fraction as do the benefits of providing liquidity and gains from trade.
Thus markets with high levels of intermediation may respond differently to
a tax than markets with little or no intermediation. This is crucial for policy
makers because it suggests that empirical studies need to be examined very
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carefully because their findings may not be applicable to more developed
markets with higher levels of intermediation.
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